SPF, DKIM and DMARC
Authenticating Every Tool That Sends as Your Domain (Sender Inventory)
List every service that sends mail as your domain, then give each one SPF coverage and DKIM signing on your domain so all of them pass DMARC.
On this page
A sender inventory is a list of every system that sends email using your domain in the From address, with a note of how each one authenticates. You need it because DMARC judges each message on its own: every tool has to pass SPF or DKIM with your domain, or its mail fails, and once you're at p=quarantine or p=reject that mail goes to spam or bounces. Build the list from your DMARC reports and your own records, then give each sender DKIM on your domain and, where it fits, a place in SPF.
Why this goes wrong
Authentication is usually set up once, for the main mail platform and the main ESP. Then the company keeps adding tools. Sales gets a CRM that sends sequences. Finance gets an invoicing app. Support gets a helpdesk. Someone wires up the website contact form. Each one sends as something@example.com, and nobody tells whoever owns DNS.
The failures this causes are quiet:
- A tool that isn't in SPF and doesn't sign with DKIM on your domain fails DMARC. At
p=noneyou don't notice. At enforcement, its mail disappears. - Adding a tool the wrong way can break everything else. A second SPF record, or one
include:too many, gives apermerror, and RFC 7208 treats that as no valid SPF result for any sender on the domain. See multiple SPF records and the 10-lookup limit. - Gmail and Yahoo now require all senders to have SPF or DKIM, and bulk senders to pass DMARC. Microsoft added similar rules for high-volume senders to Outlook.com in May 2025. An unauthenticated tool now gets rejected or junked at all three, not just at strict corporate gateways.
Step 1: Collect what you already know
Start a table with one row per sending source. Useful columns:
| Source | What it sends | From address | Envelope (Return-Path) domain | SPF covers it? | DKIM d= domain | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Google Workspace | Staff mail | name@example.com | example.com | yes | example.com | IT |
| Marketing ESP | Newsletters | news@example.com | bounce.esp.example.net | no (ESP domain) | example.com | Marketing |
| Helpdesk | Ticket replies | support@example.com | example.com | yes | helpdesk.example.net | Support |
Fill in what you can from:
- Your current SPF record. Each
include:is a sender someone authorized at some point. Look up what each one is. Some will belong to tools you stopped paying for years ago. - DKIM selectors in DNS. Records like
s1._domainkey.example.comork1._domainkey.example.comusually belong to a specific vendor. - Accounts payable. The vendor list is often the most complete record of SaaS your company uses. Any of them could be sending email as you.
- Asking each team. Marketing, sales, support, finance, HR, product and engineering. Ask: "What sends email to customers or staff using our domain?" Ask about automated mail too: password resets, receipts, alerts, scheduling links.
Step 2: Let DMARC reports fill the gaps
Your own records are never complete. DMARC aggregate reports are. If you don't have a DMARC record yet, publish one at p=none with a rua address so reports start arriving:
_dmarc.example.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com"
The DMARC generator will build it. Receivers then send daily XML reports listing every IP that sent mail claiming your From domain, how many messages, and whether SPF and DKIM passed and aligned. How to read DMARC reports explains the format.
Give it two to four weeks so monthly and quarterly senders (billing runs, renewal notices, surveys) show up. Then sort the sources into three groups:
- Legitimate and passing. Add to the inventory, nothing to fix.
- Legitimate and failing. Your work list.
- Not yours. Spoofing, or forwarded copies of your mail. Don't authorize these. They're the reason you'll eventually want enforcement.
To tie an unfamiliar IP to a tool, look up its reverse DNS, or find a sample message and read its headers with the header analyzer.
Step 3: Authenticate each sender
For every legitimate source on your list:
- Turn on DKIM with your domain. In the tool's settings, look for "domain authentication," "custom DKIM" or "branded sending." It gives you CNAME or TXT records to publish. Once it signs with
d=example.com(or a subdomain of it), that tool passes DMARC through DKIM, and DKIM survives forwarding where SPF doesn't. This is the step that matters most. - Add SPF only when the tool uses your domain in the envelope. Many ESPs use their own bounce domain, so adding them to your SPF does nothing for DMARC. If the tool offers a custom bounce or Return-Path domain (like
bounce.example.com), set that up and its SPF passes aligned too. - Keep one SPF record, under 10 lookups. Merge new includes into the existing record. Check the count with the SPF analyzer before and after.
- Use subdomains to separate streams. Sending marketing from
news.example.comand transactional mail frommail.example.comkeeps each SPF record short and stops one stream's reputation from dragging down another. - Retire what's dead. Remove includes and DKIM records for tools you no longer use. Every leftover include burns lookups and authorizes infrastructure you don't control.
Check the result with the SPF, DKIM and DMARC checker.
Step 4: Move toward enforcement
When your reports show every legitimate source passing DMARC for a few weeks, you can tighten the policy, usually p=quarantine with a percentage first, then p=reject. DMARC policy covers the rollout. The inventory is what makes that move safe: you know what you've accounted for.
How to confirm it worked
- DMARC reports show close to 100% of your legitimate volume passing, with failures only from sources you've classified as not yours.
- A test message from each tool to a Gmail account shows
SPF: PASS,DKIM: PASSandDMARC: PASSunder "Show original." - No 550 5.7.26 or Yahoo 550 5.7.9 bounces in your logs.
How to keep it current
An inventory is only useful if it stays true. Make "authenticate on our domain" a required step when any team signs up for a tool that sends email, and give one person ownership of DNS changes for mail. Review DMARC reports monthly. A new IP sending as you is either a tool someone forgot to tell you about or someone spoofing you, and you want to know which.
When to get help
If your reports show dozens of sources, your SPF record is already near 10 lookups, or you need to reach p=reject without breaking revenue mail, a second set of eyes on the inventory saves time. Get in touch.
FAQ
How many sending services is normal?
There's no standard number. Small companies often have a handful. Larger ones commonly find more in DMARC reports than anyone expected, which is why the reports matter more than memory.
Do I need both SPF and DKIM for every tool?
DMARC needs only one of them to pass and align. DKIM on your domain is the better choice because it survives forwarding. Gmail and Yahoo require both SPF and DKIM for bulk senders, so for your main marketing and transactional platforms, set up both.
What if a tool doesn't support DKIM on my domain?
Send its mail from a subdomain with its own SPF record that covers the tool, or route it through a platform you've already authenticated. If neither is possible, consider replacing the tool before you move to enforcement.
Should I add every include to my root domain's SPF?
No. Only add senders that use your root domain in the envelope. Put the rest on subdomains, and remove anything you no longer use.
Sources
- RFC 7208: Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
- RFC 7489: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
- Google Workspace Admin Help: Set up SPF
- Google: Email sender guidelines
- Yahoo Sender Hub: Sender requirements and recommendations
- Outlook.com Postmaster: Policies, practices and guidelines
Related guides
- DKIM Fail: Body Hash Did Not Verify, Signature Failed and Other CausesDKIM fails when the message changed after signing (body hash did not verify), the signed headers changed, or the receiver can't find a matching public key.
- DMARC Fail: Why DMARC Fails and How to Fix ItDMARC fails when neither SPF nor DKIM passes for a domain aligned with your From address. Usually a sender lacks custom DKIM. Here's how to find and fix it.
- DMARC Policy: p=none vs quarantine vs reject (and Getting to Enforcement)p=none only monitors, p=quarantine asks receivers to junk failing mail, p=reject asks them to refuse it. Start at none, fix your senders, then tighten.
- DMARC Record Syntax and Tags ExplainedA DMARC record is a TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain with tags for policy, reporting and alignment. Here's what each tag does and what's changed under DMARCbis.
- DMARC Reports: How to Read Aggregate (rua) and Failure (ruf) ReportsDMARC aggregate reports are daily XML summaries of every IP sending as your domain and whether it passed. Here's how to read them and what to do with them.
- DMARC, SPF and DKIM for Domains That Don't Send Email (Parked Domains)Lock down a domain that never sends email with SPF -all, DMARC p=reject and a null MX. Here are the exact records, the subdomain catch and how to check them.
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