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SPF, DKIM and DMARC

Someone Is Spoofing My Domain: What to Do

By Tom Sather•Updated October 11, 2026•7 min read

If someone is sending email as your domain, publish DMARC, fix SPF and DKIM for your real senders, then move to p=reject so receivers block the fakes.

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If someone is sending email that claims to come from your domain, the fix is DMARC at enforcement. Publish a DMARC record, use its reports to make sure every legitimate service that sends as you passes SPF or DKIM, then move the policy to p=reject. Once you're there, mailbox providers that honor DMARC will refuse the forged mail instead of delivering it.

You can't stop someone from typing your domain into a From line. What you can control is whether receivers believe it.

First, figure out what kind of spoofing it is

"Spoofing" covers three different things, and only one of them is fixed by authentication.

What the recipient seesWhat's happeningDoes DMARC stop it?
billing@example.comExact-domain spoofing: your real domain in the From addressYes, at p=quarantine or p=reject
"Example Billing" <random@gmail.com>Display-name spoofing: your name, someone else's addressNo
billing@examp1e.com or example-billing.comLookalike domain: a different domain someone registeredNo, that domain has its own (or no) DMARC

Look at the full From address in the suspicious message, not just the name. If it's your exact domain, keep reading. If it's a lookalike, skip to the section on lookalike domains below.

Signs your domain is being spoofed

  • Bounces for mail you never sent. Forged messages that hit invalid addresses bounce back to the address in the forgery, which is yours. This is called backscatter.
  • Customers or partners forward you "your" email asking whether an invoice or password reset is real.
  • DMARC aggregate reports show sending IPs you don't recognize using your domain in the From address. If you don't have DMARC yet, you have no visibility at all, which is the first thing to fix.

You can check what's published today with the email authentication checker.

Why spoofing your domain works

Email was built with no check on the From address. SPF checks the envelope sender (the Return-Path), which a spammer can set to any domain they like. DKIM proves a domain signed the message, but not which domain the reader sees. DMARC is the piece that ties them to the visible From domain: a message passes DMARC only if SPF or DKIM passes and the domain that passed matches the From domain. That match is called alignment.

A forger can't produce an aligned pass for your domain without access to your sending services or your DKIM private key. So DMARC at enforcement is exactly the control that fails forged mail. The details are in What Is DMARC? and alignment explained.

How to stop it, step by step

  1. Publish a DMARC record in monitoring mode if you don't have one. A starting record at _dmarc.example.com:

    v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com
    

    p=none changes nothing about delivery. It just turns on the aggregate reports (rua) so you can see who's sending as you. The DMARC generator will build the record for you.

  2. Inventory every legitimate sender. Your mailbox provider (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365), your marketing platform, CRM, helpdesk, billing system, website forms. Each one needs to pass SPF or DKIM with your domain aligned. The sender inventory guide walks through finding them all.

  3. Fix authentication for each one. Set up DKIM signing with your domain on every service that supports it, since DKIM survives forwarding and SPF doesn't. Add the services to SPF where needed, and watch the 10-lookup limit while you do.

  4. Read the reports for a few weeks. Sort sources into three buckets: yours and passing, yours and failing (fix these), and not yours (the spoofers). See how to read DMARC reports.

  5. Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject. Once your legitimate mail passes consistently, tighten the policy. Quarantine sends failing mail to spam. Reject tells receivers to refuse it outright. DMARC policy covers how to step up safely.

  6. Cover your subdomains. By default, the p= policy applies to subdomains too, unless you set sp= (existing subdomains) or np= (subdomains that don't exist, a tag added in the current DMARC standard, RFC 9989). Spoofers often invent subdomains like secure.example.com, so don't weaken sp= or np= without a reason.

⚠️

Don't jump straight to p=reject because spoofing is in progress. If your CRM or billing system isn't authenticated yet, you'll block your own invoices along with the forgeries. The reports in step 4 are what make enforcement safe.

Lock down domains you don't send from

Spoofers love domains that have no email records at all: an old brand name, a defensive registration, a product domain. If a domain never sends mail, publish records that say so:

example.net.          TXT  "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.example.net.   TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
example.net.          MX   0 .

The SPF record authorizes no one, the DMARC record asks receivers to reject anything claiming the domain, and the "null MX" (RFC 7505) says the domain accepts no mail. The parked domains guide covers this in more detail.

Lookalike domains and display-name abuse

DMARC on your domain does nothing about examp1e.com. For lookalikes:

  • Report the domain to the registrar's abuse contact (listed in the domain's WHOIS or RDAP record) and to the hosting provider if it has a website.
  • Report the phishing to APWG by forwarding a sample to reportphishing@apwg.org, using "Forward as attachment" if your mail client has it.
  • Warn customers if the campaign targets them, and tell them how to recognize your real messages.

For display-name abuse inside your own company (a fake "CEO" writing from a Gmail address), the fix is on the inbound side: warning banners for external senders and impersonation protection in your mail security settings.

How to confirm it's working

  • Run your domain through the authentication checker and confirm the DMARC record shows the policy you intended.
  • In your aggregate reports, the unknown sources should now show a disposition of reject (or quarantine) at the providers that report it.
  • Backscatter should taper off. Some receivers don't enforce DMARC, so it may not drop to zero.

How to keep it from coming back

Spoofing doesn't "come back" so much as it never stops trying. What breaks is your side: a new tool gets connected that sends as your domain without DKIM, and now your own mail fails at p=reject. Keep watching DMARC reports after you reach enforcement, and make DKIM setup part of onboarding any new sending service.

When to get help

If your reports show legitimate sources you can't identify or can't get to pass, or the domain is large enough that a mistake at p=reject would block real business mail, it's worth having someone review the reports before you enforce. Get in touch.

FAQ

Can I stop someone from sending email as my domain?

You can't stop them from sending it, but with DMARC at p=reject you can tell receivers to refuse it. Most major mailbox providers honor that, so the forged mail never reaches the inbox.

Will spoofing hurt my domain's reputation?

It can. Forged mail that gets complaints or hits spam traps can count against your domain at receivers that don't block it. Enforcing DMARC is the best protection.

Why am I getting bounces for emails I never sent?

That's backscatter. A spoofer used your address as the sender, the mail bounced, and the bounce came to you. It means someone is forging your domain, not that your account is compromised (though check that too if the bounced messages look like they came from your real mailbox).

Does SPF alone stop spoofing?

No. SPF checks the envelope sender, not the From address the recipient sees, so a forger can pass SPF with their own domain while showing yours. DMARC is what ties the check to the visible From.

Sources

Related guides

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